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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #4738-83/1
28 June 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM :
Acting National Intelligence Officer for Africa

SUBJECT : Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa

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Community representatives and specialists met on 21 June 1983 with the Acting NIO/AF as chairman. The attached report has not been coordinated with the other participants, but is being circulated to them. If they feel their views have been misinterpreted, or if they have significant additional concerns, I'll report further to you.

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Attachment
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WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

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OAU WRAPUP

Analysts were under no illusion that Qadahfi's rebuff at the OAU would temper the Libyan leader's meddling throughout Africa. The NSC representative called attention to one report that suggested Qadahfi would offer additional training to "progressive" African states and commented that this may be one way Qadahfi now intends to advance his interests. Although some analysts felt that occupying the OAU chairmanship might have a moderating influence on Mengistu, others thought we would see little if any change in his radical posture and that he might try to mobilize the OAU membership in ways that would be detrimental to Western interests. DIA analysts felt that no great changes would take place in the Aden Pact with Mengistu as OAU leader.

WARNING AND COLLECTION NOTE

There was a consensus among Community representatives that both analysts and collectors should be alert for indications that the Soviets might try to use Mengistu in his capacity as OAU chairman to further their policies in Africa and elsewhere.

ANGOLA/SOUTH AFRICA - Military Update

Some South African troops apparently have left the South African salient in southern Angola and returned to Namibia. It is unclear whether this represents a drawdown or a rotation. Analysts were undecided as to what

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Pretoria achieved by the substantial buildup that took place over the past several months. No dramatic operation resulted from the South African preparation as appeared likely due to the extent of the buildup.

Such military operations as occurred were mainly small unit counterinsurgency operations. Analysts were concerned that because we know little of South Africa's intentions, it is too early to conclude that their current operations are finished. The logistic buildup that Pretoria undertook over the past few months at Grootfontein and other locations is still in place. Consequently, the South Africans are better prepared than before to mount future operations more quickly.

CHAD

Discussion on Chad was set against the backdrop of the impending attack on the Habre forces at Faya Largeau. A consensus emerged that if the dissidents received extensive Libyan support, Habre's forces would be very hard pressed to defend their positions. (Subsequent to the meeting, Habre was defeated in the ensuing battle and took considerable casualties. As analysts predicted, Libyan support was extensive.)

COLLECTION NOTE

Although defeated, Habre is still an important political actor in what may now become a chaotic situation. Much depends on how Qadahfi intends to proceed. Collectors and analysts should be alert to any signs of Qadahfi's intentions.

1. Will Qadahfi press the dissidents to move militarily on N'Djamena?
2. Might he try the diplomatic gambit of calling on the Africans and other interested outside powers to support a new government of national unity in an effort to push Habre aside? There was some feeling that Qadahfi might try to enlist Mengistu as OAU chairman in such an effort.

SUDAN

DIA supported by other analysts noted the developing situation in southern Sudan. Most generally believed that Nimeri's action in splitting up the south into several administrative units is undermining the stability of his regime. The recent spate of army mutinies in the south was seen as a portent of more dangerous times ahead for Nimeri.

SNIPPETS

Although the situation in Upper Volta has eased somewhat, the outlook for continued stability is guarded. Although there is considerable circumstantial evidence of Libyan support to the rebellious troops in southern Upper Volta, it is still not clear what kind of aid Qadahfi provided them.

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